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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE TALE OF TWO LAKES-A NEW CHAPTER IN
WASHINGTON WATER LAW1
The State of Washington, through its Department of Game, pur-
chased waterfront lots on Phantom and Ames Lakes2 and developed
both properties into public fishing access areas.3 Large numbers of the
public took advantage of these facilities, fishing from boats and the
lake-shore.4 The two lakes, however, were not the kind found in true
fishermen's dreams, isolated from civilization and surrounded by for--
ests primeval. Both Phantom and Ames Lakes were surrounded by
numerous residences, whose owners brought separate actions to enjoin
the State from maintaining the public access areas, alleging nuisance
and abuse of the lakes by the State's licensees. 5 The trial courts found
'The omission of a general introductory survey and discussion of Washington
water law prior to the principal cases is justified by three excellent articles.
Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580
(1960); Johnson, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1967); Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch,
31 WASH. L. REv. 243 (1956).
'These lakes, though some miles distant from one another, are situated in the
northern portion of King County, Washington. Under the present law of Washing-
ton, both lakes are non-navigable bodies of water. See Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash.
606, 236 P. 114 (1925).
'These access areas generally included a large parking area and facilities for
launching small boats. There was no attempt by the State to develop the access areas
into public parks or similar recreation grounds.
'Interviews with residents on Phantom and Ames Lakes, and persons who had
utilized the access areas during fishing season, confirmed that the lakes were ex-
tremely popular fishing waters. The largest crowds were to be found at the lakes
on "opening day" and on the weekends.
Residents and witnesses agree that the greatest evidence of the lakes' popularity
was the first day of every fishing season. Fishermen would begin arriving well
before dawn and, after either placing their boats in the water or finding an attrac-
tive place on the lake-shore, a veritable celebration would ensue until first-light.
A person, viewing the lakes at dawn, would behold scores of boats on all parts of
the lakes and fishermen every few yards along the lake-shore.
,The plaintiffs alleged, and the trial courts found as fact, that the State's
licensees had, by their conduct and numbers, caused the following results: (1) The
market value of the plaintiffs' property had been decreased; (2) Thievery had sub-
stantially increased, including the theft of boats, boating equipment, furniture, and
other personal property; (3) Persons had relieved themselves in the lake and on the
plaintiffs' property, causing plaintiffs, their families and guests annoyance and
embarrassment; (4) Various items of garbage had been deposited in the lake and
upon plaintiffs' property; (5) Plaintiffs suffered frequent trespasses on their yards,
docks, beaches, and other property; (6) Plaintiffs and their families had suffered
personal injuries from broken bottles and other debris deposited on their property;
(7) Fishermen, trespassing on plaintiffs' beaches and docks, often harassed members
of plaintiffs' families; (8) Although hunting and shooting on the lakes were
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as fact that such abuses had occurred and persisted, and concluded that
the State's maintenance of such facilities unreasonably interfered with
the property owners' rights, constituting a taking and damaging of
property without compensation in violation of the Washington State
Constitution.6 Based on these facts and conclusions, the trial courts
permanently enjoined the State of Washington from maintaining and
operating the public fishing access areas. Upon appeal by the State,
the lower courts' injunctions were modified to provide that the State
would be enjoined only until it obtained the trial courts' approval of
comprehensive plans for regulating public use of the lakes. With this
modification, the judgments of the trial courts were affirmed. Held:
The State, where it enjoys riparian rights, need not acquire by con-
demnation the rights of other riparians before its licensees may use the
water in reasonable numbers, but it has the obligation to regulate the
number and conduct of its licensees so as to prevent undue inter-
ference with the rights of other riparians. Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d
751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake Community Club v. State, 69
Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966).
The majority of the court, though without expressly so holding,
accepted the State's contention that it enjoyed riparian status.8 From
this premise, the court concluded that such status created an inherent
obligation to police and control State licensees in order to prevent
injury to the rights of other riparians. After adverting to, and incor-
illegal, persons came onto the lakes and engaged in such activities; (9) Uncontrolled
speed boating endangered plaintiffs and their families while swimming in the
lakes; (10) The noise level on and around the lake had greatly increased.
'WASH. CONST. amend. IX provides: "No private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first
made...."
"Only four judges joined in the court's opinion. With an equal number joining
in dissent, it was left to Judge Finley, concurring specially, to cast the decisive
vote. This close division of the court reflects the difficult and evenly balanced
policy considerations involved in the instant cases.
'In the instant cases the State had acquired fee title to the riparian property.
The law is long-established in Washington that riparian rights are "inextricably
annexed" to fee-ownership of riparian property. See Hayward v. Mason, 54 Wash.
653, 104 P. 141 (1909) ; Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 38 P. 147
(1894). Therefore, the court's premise that the State, by acquisition of fee title to
the two riparian properties, enjoyed riparian status was entirely correct.
Whether the State would enjoy riparian status by acquisition of a lake-front
easement has yet to be determined by the court. This determination may well rest
upon the court's classification of the property interests encompassed by an easement.
Notwithstanding the result of that classification, it would appear that the purpose of
the easement may be dispositive. If the easement were acquired for the purpose of
providing public access to a watercourse or lake, there would be greater reason to
conclude that the easement carried with it those riparian rights necessary to fulfill
its purpose.
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porating by reference, an addendum9 surveying prior decisions involv-
ing riparian rights in Washington,'0 the court stated that it considered
the recent decision in Snively v. Jaber" to be controlling, thereafter
relying on the language of that opinion to support its decision.
In his concurring 'opinion, Judge Finley characterized the problem
before the court as one of "balancing of interests and rights.' 2 Stat-
ing that there were a number of factors'8 to be considered, he reasoned
that what was needed, rather than a strict riparian rights analysis, was
a practical common-sense approach, balancing the need to protect
private rights against the need to provide for maximum public use of
Washington's lakes.
The dissent concurred with the court's refusal to adopt the trial
courts' permanent injunction, but vigorously objected to the decree of a
temporary injunction until implementation of an approved plan of lake
regulation. Finding "no authority in law or in equity to enjoin all
members of the public for the misconduct of a few,"'14 the dissent
argued that only those abusing the lakes and riparian property should
be enjoined. The core of the dissent's reasoning was that maintenance
of the access facilities was within State police power, and to enjoin
operation of the facilities not only would be contrary to statutory com-
'69 Wn. 2d at 757, 420 P.2d at 356.
'In the court's addendum, following discussion of Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash.
606, 236 P. 114 (1925), a comment of potential significance in the future development
of Washington water law is made, 69 Wi. 2d at 758:
It must be noted that this very broad statement [referring to the preceding
quotation from Proctor v. Sim] may be limited to the arid portions of this
state; and that, in subsequent cases in the western part of the state, a lowering
of a lake or an interference with its riparian uses creates liabilities and, on
occasion, a necessity for condemnation.
With this cdmment, the court suggests for the first time that the scope of, and pro-
tection afforded, riparian rights may vary between western and eastern Washington.
A prominent authority on Washington water law has suggested that in evaluating
methods of water control and use it is necessary to consider the different clima-
tological conditions prevailing in eastern and western Washington. Johnson, Ripa-
rian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580, 583 (1960).
Although consideration of differing climatological conditions may be proper in
determining "reasonableness" or assessing the most "beneficial use" of lakes, it is
submitted that allowing geography to per se vary established legal rights within the
same state is highly questionable.
IL48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
2269 Wn. 2d at 762, 420 P.2d at 360.
" These factors were: (1) The increasing interest and recreational needs of the
public in fishing in the non-navigable lakes of the state; (2) The establishment of
state fish hatcheries for propagation of game fish, coupled with the acquisition of
lakefront, public-access areas to waters stocked by the state; (3) The fact that the
state had not acquired complete ownership of all the water-front property on lakes
having public-access areas; (4) The fact that much of the water-front property, on
such lakes as Phantom and Ames Lakes, is held in private ownership by numerous
individuals.
" 69 Wn. 2d at 766, 420 P.2d at 362.
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mand,15 but also would re-establish private fishing lakes. Also discern-
ible in the dissenting opinion was the thought that a State program,
properly within the police power, should not be subject to judicial
approval as a condition precedent to its operation. Finally, the dissent
stated that one who resides on a lake, such as Phantom or Ames Lake,
must take his property with the benefits of its location, and the correla-
tive burdens of public use of the water for recreation.
The premise that the State enjoys the status of a riparian by
acquiring property abutting non-navigable lakes should not have led
the court to conclude summarily that the determination of rights in the
instant cases was controlled by Snively v. ]aber. That case involved a
contest between two private riparians wherein the plaintiff, a land
developer, obtained an injunction against his neighbor's allowing cus-
tomers of his small resort to boat on the lake, because such persons had
littered and abused property that the plaintiff had been attempting to
develop and market. Although analogous, significant distinctions exist
between this decision and the principal cases. First, the State, when
holding property for use by the public, is a unique riparian whose
powers and number of potential licensees clearly differentiate it from
private riparians. The law of eminent domain is illustrative of the
disparity between the powers of the State and those of the citizen. 6
Once the State has acquired riparian status, by eminent domain or
otherwise, and developed access facilities for use by the public without
charge or limitation, it becomes self-evident that the number of its
licensees far exceeds the number gaining access to the lake from the
property of a private riparian. Second, the law of riparian rights has
developed in contests between private persons, such as occurred in
Snively v. faber.17 It is ill-suited for application to a dispute between a
'5 WASH. REv. CODE § 90.03.010. The language upon which the dissent particularly
relied was: "Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the
public..."
"The State enjoys the power of eminent domain by which it may acquire riparian
land or condemn the riparian rights of private property. WASH. REv. CoDE § 90.03.040.
The private riparian does not ordinarily possess this power, nor can he usually
successfully resist the State's exercise of this power for a proper objective pursuant
to the required procedures. The Washington Water Code does provide that "[A]ny
person may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property or rights
... " for the storage or application of water for the greatest public benefit. WASH.
REv. CoDE § 90.03.040. However, before a private person may exercise this right, he
must prove not only that his use would be more beneficial, but also that such use would
be of public benefit.
1 Although the right of use of the lake by the licensees of one of the litigants was
involved in that case, the heart of the controversy was the conflicting interests of two
riparians in the use of the lake surface.
[ VOL. 43 : 475
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
private riparian, or class of such riparians, and the State acting as
representative of the general public's competing interest. 8
Finally, Snively v. Jaber primarily involved the conflict of two pri-
vate persons in the use of a single lake. Only secondarily involving the
interests and property rights'9 of individuals in particular lakes, the
primary conflict in the instant cases was between "private rights" and
"public rights." This conflict is best characterized as a confrontation
of the competing socio-legal policies of protection of private property
rights and provision for public recreational development of Washing-
ton's lakes.
The court's decisions may be interpreted as an extension of the
reasonable-use-in-common principle of Snively v. Jaber to such contro-
versies as existed in the principal cases. Although this principle may be
utilitarian in litigation between parties of relatively equal interests, it is
of questionable value when parties represent greatly unequal and dis-
similar interests. Reasonableness is but the foundation from which the
court, with appreciation of the unique nature of the controversies
created by the State's involvement, should have fashioned a more
comprehensive analysis.
It is significant that the court was careful to state that it was not
necessary to condemn the riparian rights of private riparians on the
lakes in order to maintain and operate the public access facilities.
However, the court did not foreclose the alternative of such condem-
nation by proceedings in eminent domain. Therefore, the State may
28 In Snively v. faber, the licensees' right to use the lake depended upon the ripar-
ian rights of the private riparian licensors. The licensees in the instant cases sought
to come upon the lakes in their own right as members of the public. In these cases the
State only acted as the public's representative in the adjudication of the extent of per-
missible public use of the lakes.
It has been suggested that Snively v. faber has analogous application to the instant
cases because in both instances the licensees' rights were derived from the riparian
status of the licensor. Such analogical reasoning fails to appreciate the nature and
source of the licensees' rights in each case. The licensees' rights in Snively v. Jaber
were wholly derivative, Mr. Jaber's rights determining the extent of use which his
licensees could make of the lake. The licensees in the instant cases, although coming
upon the lakes over State-owned riparian property, claimed a right of use in their own
right as members of the public. The basis of this claimed right was the statutory
dedication of such waters to the public. See WASH. REv.,CoDE § 90.03.010. With as-
sertion of this direct right of use, the controversies concerning Phantom and Ames
Lakes became conflicts between relatively small groups of riparian landowners and the
public.
Although recognizing the language of the statute, the court dealt with the State as
if it were a riparian landowner. It is submitted that the possible dangers of this
approach, in terms of restrictive definition of reasonable use, are as great as those
inherent to the private riparian in adoption of any "public trust" approach.
" A riparian right is a property right in Washington. In re Clinton Water




operate access facilities pursuant to a comprehensive regulatory plan,
as directed by the court, or it may condemn the riparian rights of all
private property on the lakes and operate access facilities without a
regulatory plan. The latter alternative, however, would be one of last
resort because of the substantial expense of the condemnation
awards.
20
It is also significant that the court did not proceed under any theory
of "public trust," nor did it construe the Washington Water Code2 ' as
granting the State pre-emptive rights in non-navigable lakes. These
theories, though available to the court, have as yet to find favor in any
Washington decision. The Washington Water Code does declare that
"[A] 11 waters within the state belong to the public."2 However, this
phrase is qualified by the introductory words, "Subject to existing
rights .... ,,'2s The court's failure to adopt either a public-trust or pre-
emption theory would seem to indicate the validity of two conclusions.
First, public ownership and any trustee-power of the State are limited
to those waters not already appropriated or subject to existing riparian
rights. Second, the language, "Subject to existing rights," qualifies the
extent of State control of lakes, and inhibits pre-emptive rights being
exercised by the State in such waters.
The court wisely rejected the two solutions to the controversies
urged by the dissent. The first solution was that protection of private
rights and full recreational use of the lakes would be served best by
individual civil and criminal actions against persons committing the
alleged abuses. The dissent's second solution was that persons owning
lake-front property should be required to enjoy the benefits of such
location along with the abuses and wrongdoing by certain members of
the public. Implementation of the dissent's first solution would place
responsibility for control and regulation of lake use upon the private
'In addition to the acquisition of footage on the immediate periphery of the
lakes, the State would properly be required to compensate owners of lake-front prop-
erty for the other recognized riparian rights. Perhaps the most important compensa-
ble right involved would be the use of the lake for recreation. See Snively v. Jaber, 48
Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956). In Washington, a riparian also has an established
right to have a lake remain at such a level, and in such a condition, as to not detract
from the scenic or aesthetic value of the riparian property. Cf. In re Martha Lake
Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929). There is also a recognized riparian right
to use the lake for irrigation or drainage. See In re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wn. 2d
284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950). These rights, as well as the appraised value of the actual
property condemned by the state, are property interests protected by the Washington
State Constitution. See In re Clinton Water Dist., supra; Litka v. Anacortes, 167
Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932) ; In re Martha Lake Water Co., supra.
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.03.010.
2 Id.
2 Id.
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property owners. It is doubtful that this responsibility could be effec-
tively discharged without these persons retaining a small "police force"
to determine the identity of persons committing trespass and to appre-
hend those committing criminal acts. Rather than placing the burden
of regulation, and its inherent costs, upon the State as the court re-
quired, the dissent effectively would have placed it on the lake resi-
dents. Because the State was responsible for bringing the public upon
the lake, as part of a comprehensive plan for increasing recreational
opportunities for its citizens, the dissent's determination of regulatory
responsibility would appear unjust and inequitable. The second solu-
tion advanced by the dissent is no less troublesome than the first. A
property owner may reasonably be expected and required to take his
property subject to municipal or State easements for subterranean or
surface utilities. Residents on the shore of a navigable body of water,
such as Lake Washington or Puget Sound, may fairly be called upon to
endure occasional raucous speed-boats or to evict waterfront hikers
who may stray onto their property. However, the resident on the shore
of a relatively small non-navigable lake, having paid a premium for
privacy and accessibility to water recreation, cannot reasonably be said
to take his property subject to the abuses and depredations proven to
have taken place on and about Phantom and Ames Lakes.
In his concurring opinion,24 Judge Finley employed the proper anal-
ysis in resolving the controversy, the basis of which he defined as "the
uncontrolled, indiscriminate public use, and, more importantly, the
destructive abuse"125 of the lakes. He concluded that "a common sense"
balancing of the private property interests of the lakeside residents and
the interests of the public in the fullest development of recreational
resources was required.26 Regulation of State licensees, as a solution to
such controversies as those in the instant cases, is properly supported
by such "balancing of interests," and reflects that the overriding issue
is one of competing social policies rather than mere adjudication of
conflicting property rights.27
' 69 Wn. 2d at 761, 420 P2d at 359.
0 Id. at 762, 420 P.2d at 360.
'Although in concurring Judge Finley commended the majority opinion, it
would appear the commendation was directed to its result rather than its reasoning
since he criticized resolution of the controversy by application of the doctrine of
riparian rights as being too restrictive and limited.
Cardozo writes: "Finally, when the social needs demand one settlement rather
than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacri-
fice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends." B. CAwozo, THE NATUnE OF
TaE JuDiciAL PRocEss, 65 (1922).
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Despite the significant social aspects adhering in controversies typi-
fied by the principal cases, a more precise and utilitarian "balancing of
interests" analysis should be employed. The basic principle of such an
analysis should be: Whether the use, or abuse, of a lake by State
licensees constitutes an actionable wrong depends upon, and is meas-
ured by, the residential and commercial development of the riparian
property. Such measurement goes, primarily, to the quantum of proof
required of riparian property owners to show unreasonable inter-
ference with their property interests, and thereby compel State regula-
tion of its licensees using the lake. If the riparian property is mini-
mally developed, the property owners would be required to show gross
abuse or permanent damage in order to compel regulation. By con-
trast, if the lake is bordered by substantially developed property,
owners of that property would be required to prove only minor abuse
and continuing misconduct by the State's licensees in order to compel
regulation. In sum, whether State regulation would be decreed would
depend primarily upon the kind and extent of damage to the lake and
riparian property, as measured against the overall existing development
of the riparian property. This analysis must, in all cases, incorporate
the general test of reasonableness, allowing the court to consider addi-
tional factors2" when necessary.
Under the suggested analysis the State would be free, initially, to
create and operate fishing and recreation access facilities without regu-
lation. Should the riparian property owners object to the conduct or
number of the State's licensees, their proper course would be an action
to enjoin unregulated use of the lake by the State's licensees. 9 At trial
the court would employ the suggested analysis to determine whether
the riparians should obtain relief. Should the court determine that the
State's operation of the facilities, absent regulation, constitutes un-
reasonable interference with the plaintiff's rights, regulation would
properly be decreed." Should the riparian property owners fail to
prove that the alleged abuses, measured against riparian property
Typical factors that may assume importance in particular cases are the size of
the lake, the configuration of the lake, and the population density in the general
lbcality. The court should be free to consider any other factors relevant to the ques-
tion of general "reasonableness."
Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that riparians, acquiring residences
on the lake subsequent to establishment of conditions alleged to constitute unreason-
able interference with their interests, would not be estopped to compel State regula-
tion of the lake.
' The court should have broad discretion in framing the decree in this type of
controversy. The decree should be tailored to the particular conditions and abuses in
each case, and should have reference to seasonal patterns of abuse where they exist.
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development and other relevant factors, entitle them to relief, regula-
tion would not be decreed and the State would be free to continue its
access facility operations as before.
Resolution of such controversies by the suggested analysis has sev-
eral practical and beneficial results. First, a "balancing of interests" is
achieved by an analysis affording guidance to both attorney and judge.
Second, should the State desire to develop access areas, or similar
facilities, without assuming the financial burdens of regulation, such
development could be accomplished on those lakes not surrounded by
substantial residential or commercial development. Finally, should the
State undertake creation of access facilities on lakes with substan-
tially developed riparian property, it would be required to assume the
legitimate responsibility of regulation. It is submitted that such results
are equitable and advantageous to both the interests of private prop-
erty owners and the interests of the State in maximizing the fishing and
recreational development of Washington's lakes.
Although the court's reasoning may be subjected to criticism, and
alternative analyses may be suggested, its decisions in the principal
cases are commendable. State regulation of the lakes which it opens
for public use is not only equitable, but also preserves established legal
rights while furthering a sound social policy.3s The Washington Court
has again distinguished itself as a leader in the continuing development
of water law.
" There is little question that the expansion of sports and recreational opportuni-
ties for the general public constitutes sound public policy. The only question that
may yet remain is the specific remedy which the court fashioned to achieve this
policy. The State was required, prior to further operation of its access facilities, to
submit a regulatory plan to the trial court for approval. There are no expressions in
any of the opinions of the majority or dissent questioning that the State is within
its police power in operating the lake access facilities. It might be suggested, therefore,
that the decree required the State, in the performance of a program within its police
powers, to obtain judicial approval as a condition precedent to its implementation. This
poses interesting questions of the constitutionality, or at least propriety, of the court's
decree, particularly in regard to the very basic doctrine of separation of powers.
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DUTY TO WARN EXTENDED TO NON-COMMERCIAL
VENDOR SELLING CHATTEL "AS IS"
The ignition system of T's pickup truck had a safety switch to
prevent the engine from being started when the automatic transmis-
sion was in gear. When T accidentally broke the safety switch, the
ignition system became inoperable. To remedy that situation, T
joined the wires of the ignition system so as to bypass the broken
safety switch. He knew this modification made it possible to start
the truck even when the transmission was in gear. Later the motor
broke down, and T had the truck towed to defendant's dealership,
where he sold it "as is" to defendant. T did not tell defendant
about his modification of the ignition system.' Defendant did not in-
spect the truck.2 Two weeks later defendant's mechanic, while repair-
ing the truck, started the engine; the truck suddenly moved foward
and struck plaintiff. In plaintiff's action for personal injuries, defend-
ant impleaded T as third party defendant. The trial court granted T's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed him from the suit. On
appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Held:
An individual selling his chattel to another is subject to3 a duty to warn
'Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 423 P.2d
926, 927 (1967):
[T] did not disclose to [defendant] that he had modified the safety mechanism
in the ignition system, but he did say that the motor was inoperable and that
the drive shaft was not in place.
The court did not attach any significance to T's disclosure of his truck's other
mechanical difficulties. The important fact was that he said nothing about the
dangerous condition created by his modification of the ignition system. See 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment g (1965).
2 T sold his truck to defendant as part of a trade-in transaction. At the time of
the sale, the truck was seven years old. The motor was inoperable and the drive
shaft had been removed. Thus it was not necessary for defendant to inspect the
truck in order to place a value on it and complete the transaction.
Even though T did not see defendant inspect the truck, he was not required to
give a warning if he reasonably believed that defendant would realize the dangerous
condition of the ignition system. 2 RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b)
(1965). However, because the truck could not be operated at the time of the
transaction, a trier of fact could find that T, the vendor,
... had no reason to believe that [the vendee] would realize the dangerous con-
dition of the pickup, at least until repairs had been inade to the motor so that
the track could be operated again.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 446, 423 P.2d 926,
928 (1967) (emphasis added).
The vendor has a duty to warn only if the circumstances of the sale are found
to satisfy the requirements illustrated in note 11, infra. Because the principal
case was an appeal from summary judgment, the court remanded the case so that the
trier of fact could consider the negligence issue. On the other hand, the effect of a
[ VOL. 43 : 475
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the vendee of a condition, known to the vendor, which makes the
chattel dangerous for its intended use, even though the sale is made
"as is." Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d
443, 423 P.2d 926 (1967).
It is well established that a commercial vendor4 can be held liable
for negligently failing to warn his vendee of a condition, known to
the vendor, that makes the chattel sold dangerous for its intended
use.5 This duty to warn has been justified as an application of the
general principle that one has a duty to avoid exposing others to
unreasonable risks of bodily harm.6 In the principal case the Wash-
ington Court was faced with two questions of first impression:
whether an individual making an occasional sale is subject to the
duty to warn; 7 and if he is, whether the individual can affect his
negligence liability merely by selling the chattel "as is." A related
issue to be discussed is the effect an "as is" sale would have on the
negligence liability of a commercial vendor under similar circum-
stances.
With respect to the duty of the supplier of a chattel to disclose
conditions, known to him, that make the chattel dangerous for its
intended use, the court in the principal case adopted 2 Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 3388 without discussion.' After finding T to be
sale "as is" was decided as a matter of law. Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor
Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967).
'The term "commercial vendor" is used in this note to refer to producers or
distributors of chattels who are in the business of selling those chattels. A com-
mercial vendor is thus distinguished from an individual who occasionally sells a
chattel that he owns. The reason for the distinction is that a commercial vendor
develops a level of expertise on which his .vendees rely. See State v. Barnes, 126
N.C. 1063, 35 S.E. 605 (1900).
A special situation should be noted. For example, a retailer of shoes who sells
his neon advertising sign to another party would be considered an individual
making an occasional sale with respect to that sign. He is a commercial vendor of
shoes but not of neon signs. See id.5Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961); Walker v.
National Gun Traders, Inc., 116 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1960); Wellington v. Downer
Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc., v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp., 66 Wn. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025
(1966).
'Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 310-13 (1941).
'As recently as 1941, Dean Prosser noted that the liability of an individual
selling a chattel for negligent failure to warn had apparently not been considered by
any court. W. PRossEm, TORTs 682 (1st ed. 1941). Apparently, as of 1965 the duty to
warn, as formulated in the RESTATEMENT, had not yet been imposed on an individual
making an occasional sale. RESTATEMENT Ir THE COURTS, Torts § 388 (1945, Supp.
1954, Supp. 1965). However, the duty has been imposed on an individual who is bailor
of a chattel. Cases cited in note 60 infra.
82 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)OF TORTS § 388 (1965):
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the
1967 ]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
within the ambit of that section,1 ° the court held that the undisputed
facts would allow reasonable minds to conclude that T was negligent."
Although the court recognized that parties may "bargain for exemp-
tion from liability for the consequences of negligence" 12 if they clearly
express an intention to do so,13 the court rejected T's contention
that as a matter of law he could not be held liable for negligence
because he sold his truck to defendant "as is." 4 After noting that
chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use,
for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and
by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied
will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965) (emphasis added)
Persons included as "suppliers." The rules stated in this Section... apply to
determine the liability of any person who for any purpose or in any manner
gives possession of a chattel for another's use, or who permits another to use
or occupy it while it is in his own possession or control, without disclosing
his knowledge that the chattel is dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied .... These rules, therefore, apply to sellers, lessors, donors, or lenders,
irrespective of whether the chattel is made by them or by a third person.
"Given T's knowledge of the effect of his modification of the ignition system
and his undisputed failure to warn defendant, his vendee, of that modification,
T would be liable to defendant under the rule of 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 388 (1965) if the trier of fact found that T:
1. supplied his truck to defendant for the purpose of repair and resale, and
2. had reason to know that the truck was likely to be dangerous when used for
that purpose, and
3. had reason to expect that third parties would be endangered by this use,
at least while the truck remained in defendant's possession, and
4. had no reason to believe that defendant would realize the dangerous condition
of the truck, at least until the motor was repaired.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 444, 446, 423 P.2d 926,
927, 928 (1967).
12 Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 447, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967). Broderson v. Rainier Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d
234 (1936) states the general rule. For discussion of restrictions on contracting
away liability for negligence, see Comment, Contractual Exemption from Liability
for Negligence, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 120 (1956); Comment, Contracting Against
Liability for Negligent Conduct, 4 Mo. L. Rxv. 55 (1939).
' Luedeke v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 124, 231 N.W. 695 (1930).
' T based his argument on Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63
N.W.2d 720 (1954), and Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d
419 (1953). However, in both those cases the sale "as is" was made in a context
that precluded finding the vendor liable for negligent failure to warn. In Pokrajac,
supra, the purchaser expressly agreed that he had examined the vehicle and knew
what he was buying. The contract of sale provided, in part:
In case the car covered by this order is a used car, the undersigned purchaser
states that he has examined it, is familiar with its condition, is buying it as a
used car, as is, and with no guaranty as to condition ....
Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 399, 63 N.W.2d 720, 721 (1954). The
vendor in the principal case made no inspection of the truck, and the court dis-
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an "as is" sale normally excludes warranties,"5 the court concluded
that "the term 'as is' by itself amounts solely to a disclaimer of
warranty."' Absence of warranties does not preclude liability for
negligence.' Therefore, T could be held liable for a negligent failure
to warn even though he sold his truck "as is."
A vendor's duty to warn was recognized at an early date as a
particularization of one's general duty to avoid exposing others to
unreasonable risks of bodily harm.'" Recent cases have imposed this
duty on the commercial vendor under varying circumstances. He
must warn his vendee of a condition which he has reason to know
makes the chattel dangerous when used" or dangerous if used in a
particular way. 0 However, the vendor does not have to warn of
danger which he reasonably believes to be known to the vendee."'
tinguished Pokrajac for that reason. Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 445, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 927, 929 (1967). Thrash was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the injury there occurred after the vendee had resold
the vehicle as a reconditioned used vehicle without replacing a mismatched lock
ring on a wheel. Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419
(1953), discussed in note 41 infra; Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967). Thus, because the facts of both
Thrash and Pokrajac precluded finding the vendor liable, there was no negligence
liability for an "as is" sale to disclaim. Therefore, in neither Thrash nor Pokrajac
was the fact of a sale "as is" of itself held to be an express assumption of risk by
the vendee.
' Champlin v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959);
Robinson v. Carter, 77 A.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) (dictum); First
Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965)
(alternative holding); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316(3)(a)(1966); 23
MINN. L. REv. 784, 793 (1939).
"°Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 447, 423 P.2d
926, 928 (1967). See discussion in note 54 infra.
12 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 547 n.6 (1966); W.
PROSSER, TORTS 491 (2d ed. 1955).
" E.g., Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870). See
Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 310-13 (1941).
E.g., Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963) (toxic chemical).
E.g., Hopkins v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952)
(although a construction worker can be expected to know about the general danger
of working with dynamite, the manufacturer may have a duty to warn of the specific
danger created by loading dynamite into a freshly drilled hole in hard rock while
other holes are being drilled close by); cf. Hopkins v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 212 F.2d 623 (1954), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 872 (1954) (same case as above;
on appeal after retrial held that manufacturer did not have a duty to warn, because
additional facts produced at the new trial showed that the vendee knew about the
specific danger); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926)
(held that manufacturer gave sufficient warning that its tractor might flip over
backwards if power was suddenly applied to the rear wheels when mired in mud).
Instructions for use are not necessarily sufficient to discharge the duty to warn
of danger created by improper use. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LLABILrrY §8.05 [1] (1966); Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for
Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. Rzv. 145 (1955).
' Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co., 79 Nev. 441, 386 P.2d 396 (1963) (dangerous
condition apparent to casual observer); Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37




Although the commercial vendor's duty to warn was established
at an early date,22 he was initially liable for negligence only to a
relatively small class of persons. Early cases barred recovery by
one not in privity of contract with the vendor.2 3 As courts began to
accept the proposition that injury to a subvendee is a foreseeable
consequence of the negligence of a commercial vendor, the privity
requirement was gradually eliminated.2 4 It is now generally accepted
that a commercial vendor's liability for negligence with respect to
chattels he sells extends to third parties not in privity of contract
with him.2 5 The development of this area of negligence law has
been primarily concerned with deciding to whom a commercial vendor
owes a duty of reasonable care rather than with establishing his duty
to warn.26
Unlike a commercial vendor, an individual who makes an occasional
sale does not have a business reputation at stake, and consequently
his vendee is less likely to expect him to stand behind his product.2
Nevertheless an individual, like a commercial vendor, is generally
required to avoid exposing others to unreasonable risks of bodily
harm . 2  For that reason the individual who sells a chattel should
Although the general danger of using a chattel is apparent, the vendor may be
required to warn of a specific danger that is not apparent. E.g., Hopkins v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952), discussed briefly in note 20
su pra.
'See note 18 supra.
' See the cases discussed in Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
F. 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1903). The rule was justified as a necessary limit to a vendor's
liability. Id at 867, 869.
' Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Huset is a classic example of how the privity requirement was gradually under-
mined by the exceptions that were made to mitigate the harshness of the general
rule. Recovery was allowed against the manufacturer of a threshing machine found
to have been imminently dangerous to life and limb, by one not in privity of
contract with him. The exception was made on the basis of
... the underlying principle of the law of negligence, that it is the duty of every
one to so act himself as to so use his property as to do no unnecessary damage to
his neighbors ....
Id at 866. For further discussion of how privity was eventually removed from
negligence actions, see Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than
Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 136-39 (1937) ; 21 MINN. L. REv. 315,
315-21 (1937).
- Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Freeman v.
Navarre, 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
- Discussed at notes 18, 24 supra.
'This is a reason usually given to justify imposing the implied warranty of
merchantability on merchants. See Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 118-22 (1942). This warranty is an alternative to
negligence as a basis for recovery. See Prosser, supra, at 117. It is advantageous to
the vendee because he does not have to prove that the vendor was negligent. E.g.,
11 KAN. L. Rav. 168 (1962). Warranty liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
' James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. Rav. 44 (1955).
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be subject to the duty to give his vendee a reasonable warning.29
This conclusion, reached in the principal case, is merely an applica-
tion of the general principle underlying the commercial vendor
cases.
3 0
The court resolved the negligence issue by adopting 2 Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 338.31 This rule was properly applied in the
principal case to an individual who knew of the condition that created
the danger. 2 Given a vendor's knowledge of the chattel's condition,
it is for the trier of fact to decide whether from that knowledge he
had reason to know that the chattel was dangerous for its intended
use.3 This requires an inference from condition to danger. The
Restatement rule also applies to a vendor who has reason to know,
from facts generally within his knowledge, of a condition that is
likely to render the chattel dangerous.34 This requires an inference
from known facts to condition to danger. It is for the trier of fact
to determine whether the vendor knew or had reason to know of the
condition and whether he knew or had reason to know of the danger.
Any expertise the vendor may have will influence the determinations.3 5
A review of past cases suggests that a manufacturer, and occasionally
a distributor," of chattels has a duty to acquire knowledge about the
'In each case, it must first be determined whether the vendor does have a duty
to warn. See, e.g., note 11 supra. If he does have the duty, then he must exercise
reasonable care to communicate his knowledge of the danger in order to make safe
use of the chattel likely. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment b
(1965). Although subject to liability to subsequent users of the chattel, 2 RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment a (1965), a vendor is not necessarily
required to warn the users. A vendor can discharge the duty by warning his
vendee, if it is reasonable for him to rely on his vendee to eliminate the danger of
which he has been made aware or to pass the warning on to subsequent vendees.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment n (1965). Thus in the principal
case, although plaintiff could have sued T directly, T would have satisfied the duty
to warn by telling defendant about his modification of the ignition system of his
truck.
'Discussed at p. 485 supra.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §388 (1965), quoted in note 8 supra.
'Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 444, 423 P.2d
926, 927: "[T] was well aware of the effect of the modification he made."
Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961) (manufacturer
knew that corrosion of steel containers by its product would produce explosive
hydrogen gas; from this knowledge it should have inferred that containers filled with
its product were dangerous in the absence of a warning to call attention to the
importance of handling the containers carefully and keeping them away from ex-
cessive heat).
" James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 44, 48 (1955). Professor James
notes the distinction between "dangers known to the supplier" (see notes 32 and
33 and accompanying text, supra) and "conditions known to [the supplier], the
danger of which a reasonable man in his place would recognize." Id.
1 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 289(b) (1965).
'This manufacturers' duty is also imposed on one who supplies a chattel as his
own product. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wn.2d 468, 374
P.2d 549 (1962) ; 2 RETATEmENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS § 400 (1965).
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chattels he places on the market 7 in addition to a duty to warn.3'
These cases require him to supplement his existing knowledge with
additional facts so that he can make an inference, reasonable in light
of his position as manufacturer, from those additional facts to condi-
tion to danger. This additional duty should not be placed on the
individual, because he lacks the manufacturer's special knowledge and
opportunity to make the chattels safe.3"
The expertise of the vendee will affect the existence of the vendor's
duty to warn. If a chattel is sold to a vendee who deals in goods of
that kind as part of his business,4" one might expect that, because
of his experience, he would be more likely than an individual to
realize a chattel's dangerous condition, and hence be less apt to
need a warning.4  This element is incorporated into the Restatement
' Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 494 (3d Cir. 1963) (manufacturer of
chemical should know its toxicity); Mealey v. Super Curline Hair Wave Corp.,
342 Mass. 303, 173 N.E.2d 84 (1961) (manufacturer of hairdressing lotion should
know that it might cause scalp burns); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wn.2d
458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) (duty applied to dealer who sold second hand car as a
reconditioned used car). There is language suggesting this duty in Golden Gate
Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wn.2d 469, 474, 403 P.2d 351, 355
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966); cf. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat, Inc.,
60 Wn.2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962).
A retailer who does not sell a chattel as his own product does not have this duty
with respect to that chattel. Simmons v. Richardson Variety Stores, 52 Del. 80,
137 A.2d 747 (Super. Ct. 1957); Ringstad v. I. Magnin Co., 39 Wn.2d 923, 239
P.2d 848 (1952).
The rule of Restatement § 388 does not itself require a vendor to make any
inspection, "no matter how cursory." 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388,
comment in (1965).
'The manufacturer's duty to acquire additional knowledge about his product
complements his duty to warn. See cases cited in note 37 suepra. On the other hand,
a duty to make reasonable inspections is separate from the duty to warn, and
provides an alternative basis for recovery. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
The distinction between the duty to inspect and the duty to acquire additional
knowledge is illustrated by the somewhat extreme case of Hopkins v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952). A construction worker was killed
while loading a drill hole with dynamite manufactured by defendant. The dynamite
exploded prematurely because of the unusually high temperature and vibration
created by drilling in hard rock. Defendant was held subject to liability for
negligently failing to warn of the specific danger created by loading the dynamite
into a hole freshly drilled in hard rock while other holes were being drilled close by,
even though defendant had no actual knowledge of his specific danger. See id. at
933 n.3. The court held that defendant was required to have this knowledge. The
result was reached on the basis of defendant's failure to warn; there was no claim
the defendant negligently failed to inspect the dynamite. Id. at 932.
' Cf. cases cited in note 37, supra.
" See the definition of "commercial vendor," note 4 supra.
" In Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953), the
defendant sold his used vehicle "as is" to an automobile dealer. After resale, the
dealer's vendee was injured when an insecure lock ring on a wheel caused the
vehicle to go out of control. In refusing to hold defendant liable for failing to warn
of this dangerous condition, the Ohio Court relied on the dealer's duty to inspect
the vehicle before selling it as a reconditioned used vehicle. Id. Messrs. Frumer
and Friedman seem to interpret Thrash as holding that an individual who sells his
used car to an automobile dealer cannot be held liable to a vendee of the dealer for
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rule, which considers the vendor's reasonable belief that the vendee
will realize the danger in determining whether or not the vendor
has a duty to warn in a particular case.42 The reasonableness of
the vendor's belief is controlling; actual failure of the vendee to
realize the danger is unimportant.43
Once the possibility of a vendor's liability for negligent failure
to warn is acknowledged, it must be decided whether selling a chattel
"cas is" is sufficient to vitiate that liability. At the outset a distinction,
implicit in the result of the principal case, 4 should be noted between
the two alternatives available to the vendor who desires to avoid
the risk of liability. He can preclude liability by insisting on a
provision in the contract of sale whereby the vendee agrees to assume
the risk of the vendor's negligence.45 Or, he can bring to the attention
of the vendee facts which constitute a warning of danger sufficient
under the circumstances to preclude a finding of negligence. 6 In
the principal case the vendor did neither.
failing to warn. 2 L. FRumER & M. FaIEDr.AN, PRODUCTS LIABI.ITY 466 (1966).
This interpretation of the holding is too broad.
The Restatement rule adequately covers the resale situation. An owner who sells
his vehicle to a dealer without warning of a dangerous condition, but who reason-
ably believes that the dealer will realize the danger, would not be found negligent.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b) (1965). If the owner does warn the
dealer, he probably would not be found negligent. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF TORTS § 388, comments g, n (1965). In these two instances, the Ohio Court's
reluctance to impose too heavy a burden on the owner should be vindicated. If,
however, the owner gives no warning, and cannot reasonably believe that the dealer
will discover the particular dangerous condition that later causes injury, then he
should be subject to liability for negligence under the Restatement rule. See 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388, comment b (1965); cf. id., comment e. The
view of Frumer and Friedman is too broad because it does not account for the
latter possibility.
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388(b) and comment k (1965).
"Thus, in the principal case the vendee did fail to realize, until after the time
of plaintiff's injury, that the truck could be started when the transmission was in
gear. However, the court left it to the trier of fact to determine whether T had
reason to believe that defendant would realize the dangerous condition. Fleming
v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 446, 423 P.2d 926, 928
(1967), quoted in note 2 supra.
" See discussion at pp. 492-93 infra.
"References cited notes 12, 13 supra.
"The vendor can preclude a finding of negligence against him by giving his
vendee an adequate warning. 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment
g (1965); Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to
narn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). He may accomplish the same objective indirectly
by requiring his vendee to inspect the chattel and purchase it in reliance solely on
his inspection. See the treatment of Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398,
63 N.W.2d 720 (1954), by the court in the principal case. Fleming v. Stoddard
Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926, 929 (1967), discussed
in note 14 supra. However, the vendee's inspection will insulate the vendor from a
finding of negligence only if the vendor can reasonably believe that the inspection
as made by the vendee will reveal the dangerous condition of the chattel to the
vendee. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (b) (1965) and comment k;
cf. George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alas. 1963). In George the vendor of a trailer
was held liable to the vendee for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
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Selling a chattel "as is" cannot by itself be sufficient to discharge
a vendor's duty to warn. The purpose of a warning, if one is required,
is to eliminate danger by providing the vendee with the vendor's
knowledge of the chattel's dangerous condition.47 The term "as is"
does not communicate that knowledge. Nor, in the principal case,
would the vendor have sold his chattel "as is" in order to disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability. That warranty does not
arise when an individual makes an occasional sale.4" Therefore, it
could be argued that in a sale by an individual without warranties,
a purchase "as is" constitutes as a matter of law an express assump-
tion by the vendee of the risk of the vendor's negligence." Otherwise,
the argument proceeds, the term "as is," intended by the parties to
mean something, is rendered meaningless. The difficulty with that
argument is its assumption that the term "as is" is always intended
to limit the vendor's liability for physical harm. That assumption
is inaccurate. Parties to a sale could very well intend the term
"as is" to be an expression of their agreement that the vendor is
not required to restore the chattel to a particular state of repair.5"
So used, "as is" would not be intended as an assumption of the
risk of physical harm.
Underlying the court's disposition of the principal case is the
premise that a sale "as is," without more, can vitiate a vendor's
liability for negligence only if the term is interpreted as an express
assumption of risk by the vendee. There is a heavy burden of
proof on a party who asserts that someone else has agreed to assume
when the trailer was destroyed by a fire caused by loose fuel line fittings. The
court said, at 105:
[The vendors] may not escape their warranty of merchantable quality on the
ground that [the vendee] had inspected the trailer, for the reason that the defect
was a hidden mechanical deficiency which would not be discernible by the
ordinary person using reasonable care while looking over a trailer with a view
toward purchasing it as a family home.
," See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment g (1965).
' The implied warranty of merchantability applies only to sales by merchants.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314(1) (1966) (effective midnight, June 30, 1967);
Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Com-
,nercial Code, 35 WASH. L. REv. 617, 626 (1960); see WASH. REv. CODE §
63.04.160(2) (1925) (applicable to the principal case; superseded by WASHa. REv.
CODE ANN. § 62A.2-314(1) (1966)).
" Cf. 39 VA. L. REv. 387 (1953). This argument was not presented to the court in
the principal case. Brief of Respondent, Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70
Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 423 P.2d 926 (1967).
'For example, suppose A offers to buy B's pickup truck for $500, if B will
repair the tailgate and fix a tear in the seat. B rejects that offer. After a period of
bargaining, A says, "O.K., I'll pay $450 for your truck, as is, and fix the seat and
tailgate myself." B accepts. It is doubtful that A, by using the term "as is," intended
to assume all risk of hidden mechanical dangers about which B remained silent.
See Swisher v. Miami Motors, 81 Ohio App. 97, 72 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1947)
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the risk of his negligence. 51 When used to avoid tort liability, the
term "as is" ordinarily is intended to be a disclaimer of implied
warranties." This meaning does not communicate to a vendee that
he has assumed all risk of the vendor's negligence with respect to
the chattel sold.53 For this reason, a sale "as is," without more,
does not exempt from negligence liability an individual who sells a
chattel. 4 It is submitted that the same rule should apply to sales
by commercial vendors. 5
The Restatement imposes the duty required by § 388 on any person
who supplies a chattel for another to use.56 Because the court adopted
§ 388 without discussion, it is not entirely clear that the rule will be
broadly applied in the future. However, because the significant act
is the supplying of a chattel for another's use,57 without regard to
economic benefit, the rule should also apply to donors,55 lessors,5 9
and all kinds of bailors60 of chattels.
(dictum); cf. Draisner v. Schlosberg, 57 A.2d 202 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948).
' E.g., Leudeke v. Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co., 120 Neb. 124, 231 N.W. 695 (1930);
6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472, at 602-04 (1962); see 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1825, at 5169-70 (1938).
'Cases cited note 15 supra; cf. Stalik v. United States, 247 F.2d 136 (10th Cir.
1957).
By purchasing a chattel "as is," the vendee is willing to take the risk of an
unprofitable bargain, generally in consideration of a reduced price. See Findley
v. Downing Motors, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 682, 54 S.E.2d 716 (1949); Johnson v.
Waisman Bros., 93 N.H. 716, 36 A.2d 634 (1944); Swisher v. Miami Motors, 81
Ohio App. 97, 72 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1947) (dictum). This does not mean that he intends
to take the risk of personal injuries caused by hidden danger. See James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192, 210-11 (1956); see also Stalik v. United States,
247 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1957).
" This proposition is established as a matter of law by the principal case.
Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 448, 423 P.2d 926,
929 (1967). The court states that "the term 'as is' by itself amounts solely to a
disclaimer of warranty." Id. at 447, 423 P.2d at 928 (1967) (emphasis added).
By distinguishing Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, 226 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954),
rather than rejecting it, the court appears to have left open the possibility that a
sale "as is," together with additional evidence, may preclude a vendor's liability
for negligent failure to warn. See the discussion in note 14, supra, for a possible
example (vendee's agreement that he had examined the chattel and knew what he was
buying).
The failure of a sale "as is" to commnicate to a vendee that he has assumed
all risk of the vendor's negligence does not depend on the identity of the vendor.
See notes 15, 53 supra, and authorities cited.
' 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note
10, supra.
'Id. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 45-47 (1955).
'Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929);
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10,
supra; cf. Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941)
(duty to warn did not arise because donor of gas had no actual knowledge of the
dangerous condition).
' Monroe v. East Bay Rental Service, 111 Cal. App. 2d 574, 245 P.2d 9 (1952);
La Rocca v. Farrington, 301 N.Y. 247, 93 N.E.2d 829 (1952); 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10, supra.
' Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 99 N.W.2d 76 (1959) (gratuitous bailor); 2
1967 ]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The court reached a correct result in the principal case. Imposing
the duty to warn on an individual, in appropriate circumstances, is
consistent with the general principle of negligence law that an indi-
vidual should not expose others to unreasonable risks of physical
harm.6 ' No one should have the privilege to foist on someone else
machinery that he knows to be dangerous. If a vendor wants to
avoid the risk of liability, he can try to obtain an express assumption
of risk from the vendee. In practice, this may not be feasible. -
His alternative is to give his vendee adequate warning. An advantage
of this alternative is that dangerous conditions are more likely to
be made safe if the vendee is put on notice that they exist. It is
also the safest course for the vendor to follow, and demands no
more than reasonable attention to the safety of others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment c (1965), quoted in note 10,
supra; Thomas v. Ribble, 404 Pa. 296, 172 A.2d 280 (1961) (owner brought car to
garage to have it repaired)."1 James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 44-47 (1955).
12 In a sale by an individual to a dealer, the vendor may lack bargaining power
sufficient to obtain such an agreement. In a sale to an individual, if the vendee is
asked to sign a contract whereby he agrees to assume all risks of harm caused by
the chattel, he may begin to wonder what is wrong with the chattel and decide to
buy elsewhere.
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